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Abstract—Auctions have been employed as an effective frame-
work for the management and the assignment of tasks in mobile
crowdsensing (MCS). In auctions terminology, the clearance
rate (CR) refers to the percentage of items that are sold
over the duration of the auction. This research is concerned
with maximizing the CR of reputation-aware (RA) auctions in
centralized, participatory MCS systems. Recent techniques in the
literature had focused on several challenges including untruthful
bidding and malicious information that might be sent by the
participants. Less attention has been given, though, to the number
of completed tasks in such systems, even though it has a tangible
impact on the satisfaction of service demanders. Towards the
goal of maximizing CR in MCS systems, we propose two new
formulations for the bidding procedure that is a part of the
task allocation strategy. Simulations were carried out to evaluate
the proposed methods and their impact on the user utility,
under varying number of auctions, tasks, and participants. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of the suggested methods through
consistent and considerable increases (three times increase, in
some cases) in the CR compared to the state-of-the-art.
Index Terms—Mobile crowdsensing, internet of things, auc-
tions, descriptive bidding
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) denotes a network of possibly
objects, sensors, and devices that are connected through com-
munications and information infrastructure to provide a wide
variety of services [1]. With the high-paced advances in emerg-
ing wireless technologies (e.g. 4G/5G) and micro-embedded
highly accurate sensors (such as gyroscope, barometer, etc.),
smartphones and other intelligent mobile devices do not only
act as communication devices, but they can also collect in-
formation and be programmed to transmit such measurements
wirelessly over the internet. With such a pervasive computing
paradigm, it had been stimulating for another paradigm, the
Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS), to get realized. The latter is
inspired by crowdsourcing, as a distributed problem-solving
model, where a large number of volunteers get involved in
order to solve a complex problem. Through sensor-equipped
mobile devices, MCS is used to acquire local knowledge and
to measure and map phenomena of common interest [2], [3].
This has been employed in environmental applications [4]
(e.g., measuring air quality and noise levels), in infrastruc-
ture research [5] (e.g. measuring traffic congestion and road
conditions), and in social applications [6] (e.g. share restaurant
information, and crowding counting). The general architecture
of a MCS system is shown in Fig 1.
Centralized MCS applications, which consist of a central
platform and a number of smartphones, involve different forms
of sensing, namely, participatory and opportunistic sensing.
The former requires active involvement of users in sensing
and decision-making, while the latter automatically detects
a state of interest and changes the device state to satisfy
an application request. As participatory sensing can support
diverse applications, it is widely applied in MCS systems [7].
Throughout the past decade, many crowdsensing platforms
have been proposed such as MOSDEN [8], OpenSignal, and
LifeMap [9]. Also, Google has developed a MCS application
called Science Journal. These platforms bear both, high poten-
tial and limitations of MCS systems [10], [11]. One of the most
critical limitations is the restrained computational and power
resources of smartphones. Hence, most smartphone users
need a kind of compensation in order to participate. High-
paced research has focused on developing effective incentive
mechanisms in order to ensure users willingness to share their
sensing data.
In research, incentives can be classified using diverse ap-
proaches; a widely used approach is to classify them as either
monetary or non-monetary [12]. In relation to the scope of this
work, we limit the discussion to monetary mechanisms, where
the payments to participants can either be static or dynamic.
In the static approach, the amount of reward remains constant
through the whole experiment. The authors of [13] defined
two incentive mechanisms: 1) The platform-centric model,
where the static payment for each winner is determined by the
platform. The process is modeled as a Stackelberg game–the
participants against the platform. 2) The user-centric model,
that is a reverse auction approach, where the platform has no
control over payments to each winner. Also, it was shown
that user-centric local search- based auction is vulnerable to
untruthful bidding. This problem was addressed in the same
study by the Msensing auction. Nevertheless, Msensing has
also shown vulnerability to users aiming to send malicious
information. To address this challenge, the authors of [14] pro-
posed a reputation-aware (RA) incentive mechanism (TSCM),
which is considered to be the RA version of the Msensing.
While a considerable body of research has addressed the
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Fig. 1: The general architecture of a MCS system.
improvement of task assignment and user compensation mech-
anisms as two fundamental stages in MCS system design,
much less attention has been given to maximizing the CR–the
number of accomplished tasks–in auction-based campaigns.
This is despite the fact that high CR implies higher system ef-
ficiency and quality of service, and maximizes the satisfaction
of service demanders. However, the platform usually achieves
a low CR inevitably due to many reasons, among which, is
the presence of un-bided tasks and/or out-of-reach tasks as
illustrated in Fig. 2. The limited platform budget is also one
main reason for lack of task coverage. In the rest of this paper,
we use the terms clearance rate, task completion ratio, and
task coverage ratio interchangeably.
This research addresses the challenge of maximizing the
task completion ratio in centralized, participatory MCS sys-
tems. The contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
1) We propose two new bidding-based task allocation pro-
cedures/ strategies for maximizing the platform utility by
maximizing the number of covered tasks in a campaign.
2) We demonstrate a remarkable enhancement in task
completion ratios compared to other methods in the
recent literature. Also, we present the algorithm analysis
and simulations under varying scenarios and conditions.
Finally, we identify the drawbacks of the proposed
techniques.
3) Although we are aware of [15], to the best of our
knowledge, this research is the first to address the max-
imization of CR of auction-based participatory sensing
systems by proposing novel bidding procedures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A description
of the proposed methods is presented in sec. II. Results are
discussed in sec. III. Finally, conclusions and future work are
given in sec. IV.
II. AUCTIONS BASED ON DESCRIPTIVE BIDDING
In this section, we discuss the proposed two-stage bid (2SB)
and per-task bid (PTB) algorithms. A summary of the symbols
and the notations that are used throughout this document is
Fig. 2: An illustration inspired by [13] depicting participants
(red dots) interested in tasks (yellow squares) within their areas
of interest (dashed circles).
given in Table I. Both of the proposed bidding procedures
allocate tasks to participants while aiming to maximize the
number of the accomplished sensing tasks in a campaign.
These greedy algorithms are approximations of the NP-hard
problems of task allocation and auction winner selection. For
every sensing campaign [16]:
• Each smartphone i ∈ 1, · · · , N represents a participant
in the auction.
• The platform sends the details of the M campaign tasks,
where tasks are indexed by j ∈ 1, · · · ,M .
• All of the participants should take part in the bidding
process for the tasks they are interested in, and each
bidder should at least bid on one task.
• Winner selection and payment determination algorithms
are then used to find the sets S and {P}.
Unlike previous techniques that do not take budget con-
straints and/or the CR into consideration [14], and/or assume
a constant-yet-arbitrary budget [15], our proposed bidding
procedure link the number of campaign tasks to the platform
budget, and maximize the task completion ratio.
Two-stage Bidding. For a campaign with a set of tasks T ,
with cardinality |T | = M , every potential participant, who
is interested in a subset of tasks Ti ⊂ T , sends two types of
bids to the platform, namely, a collective bid and a descriptive
bid. The former is the classical form of bidding, commonly
discussed in the literature, that resembles a wholesale or
bidding in bulk, where the user asks for one collective payment
in return for all the tasks in Ti. In descriptive bidding, however,
a participant sends a list of tasks and a separate bid for each
of them. Throughout this document, we refer to this list as the
list of per-task user bids. The summation of the per-task user
bids for the user i is given by:
Bi =
Mi∑
j=1
Xij .Bij . (1)
TABLE I: A summary of symobls and notations used throughout the document
Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning
M , N Number of tasks, Number of participants B Platform budget
P Set of participants V Sum of campaign tasks values
Vj Value of task j {V } Values of set of tasks
T Set of all campaign tasks Ti Set of tasks done by user i
Mi The number of tasks done by user i Ri Reputation of user i
R Participants reputation set Bci Collective bid for user i
Bij bid of user i for task j (descriptive bid) S Set of primary winners (selected users)
{Bc} Set of collective bids by participants Ss Set of secondary winners (selected users)
P Sum of all payments to primary winners Pi Payment to winner i
T si (S
s) Set of tasks allocated for secondary winner i over the set Ss {P} The set of payments
Xij Flag if the user i is interested in task j or not, Xij ∈ {0, 1} V Ri (S) Reputational value for user i over set S
Unless the bidder is interested in only one task, the sum of the
descriptive bids is usually more than the collective bid [17].
The steps of the reputation-aware 2SB is given by algorithm
listing 1 below. Following previous work in the literature [14],
the algorithm starts by calculating the marginal contribution
(or marginal value) for each participant, as formulated by [14],
and then subtracts their collective bids from the resultant value
(line 3). Afterwards, tasks are allocated to a set of winners,
called primary winners (lines 5,6), that are chosen such that
the budget (same as platform utility in [14]) is maximized.
The mathematical expression of the budget is given in 2. It is
worth mentioning that for reputation-unaware (RU) bidding,
Ri = 1 for user i.
Following the payment calculation for the primary winners,
and given the budget of the platform, we can determine the
remaining budget that is available–before getting a negative
utility–to accomplish the tasks that had not been covered by
primary winners. This is given by:
B = V − P. (2)
Unless the set of M tasks have been covered by the primary
winners, the platform proceeds to the second stage of the
algorithm. Using the descriptive bids, the platform determines
another set of winners, called the secondary winners, to
whom the uncovered tasks are allocated (lines 33-37). On
the expense of the budget, the platform pays the secondary
winners according to their descriptive bids in order to achieve
a higher CR. This happens because either they are the only
bidders for some tasks or because of their unique location
near to particular tasks afar from the crowd. Moreover, unlike
primary winners, while assigning uncovered tasks to secondary
winners, the platform ensures that a task would not be covered
more than once, for better budget management (lines 26-32 for
budget computation, lines 38-43 for budget update).
Per-task Bidding. The 2SB algorithm starts off the auc-
tion with collective bidding and then handles the uncovered
tasks using descriptive bidding. The per-task bidding (PTB)
procedure, however, manages the whole auction, from the
beginning, by descriptive bids. Consequently, this procedure
does not require the user’s collective bid.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The simulation is done in an area of (1000 m × 1000 m)
in which participants and tasks are are uniformly distributed.
Each participant is surrounded by an area of interest of 30m
radius as depicted in Fig. 2. Following [13], [14], the value of
each task and the participants’ collective bids vary uniformly
in [1,5] and [1,10] respectively. Similarly, the per-task bids
vary uniformly in the range [Vj−α, Vj+α], and we set α = 2
in our simulations. The participants’ reputations are varied
uniformly from 0.6 to 0.9. To evaluate the effectiveness of our
algorithms, we compare the performance of the reputation-
aware and reputation-unaware versions of the 2SB and the
PTB algorithms to two algorithms from the literature, namely,
Msensing [13] and TSCM [14] as representatives of reputation-
unaware and reputation-aware techniques respectively. We use
two metrics in our evaluation, the tasks completion percentage
and the user utility. Three factors are considered in our
simulations which are: the number of auctions, the number
of tasks, and the number of participants. Table II summarizes
simulated scenarios and their corresponding parameter values.
A. Simulation Results for Two-stage Bids
1) The impact of varying the number of auctions on the
CR: First, we investigate the impact of the number of held
auctions on the performance of the platform. As summarized
in Table III, for both reputation-aware and reputation-unaware
2SB, the CR achieved by the proposed method is close to
three times higher than TSCM and Msensing. The average
percentage of tasks completion is nearly constant, regardless
the number of auctions.
2) The impact of varying the number of tasks on the CR:
Fig. 3 shows that the proposed method, with its reputation-
aware and reputation-unaware versions, consistently achieves
higher CRs than TSCM and Msensing. When the number
of available tasks (M ) increases, the CR is expected to
increase in all of the algorithms. Meanwhile, the proposed
algorithm maintained the highest CR among the techniques
under consideration. This is because other techniques aim at
maximizing the user and the platform utility through only
one stage of bidding (collective bidding), while our algorithm
Algorithm 1 Reputation-aware two-stage bid
1: procedure GET PRIMARY WINNERS({V }, {Bp})
2: S ← Φ, Stasks ← Φ
3: h← argmax
p∈P
V Rp (S)− bpRp
4: while bhRh < V
R
h
∧
S 6= P do
5: S ← S ∪ h , Stasks ← Th
6: h← argmax
p∈P\S
V Rp (S)− bpRp
7: end while
8: end procedure
9: procedure GET WINNERS PAYMENTS({V }, {Bp}, S)
10: for p ∈ P do
11: Pp ← 0
12: end for
13: for i ∈ S do
14: S′ ← S \ {i},Θ = Φ
15: repeat
16: q ← argmax
V∈S′\Θ
(V RV (Θ)− bVRV )
17: Pi ← max(Pi,min{V Ri (Θ)−(V Rq (Θ)− bqRq )})
18: Θ← Θ ∪ {q}
19: until bqRq ≥ V Rq
∨
Θ = S′
20: end for
21: end procedure
22: B = V − P
23: if Stasks 6= T then
24: Ss = Φ
25: T s = Φ
26: for p ∈ P \ S do
27: for t ∈ Tp do
28: if t ∈ Stasks then
29: Tp = Tp \ t
30: else if t ∈ T \ Stasks then
31: P s ← P s ∪ {p}
32: end if
33: end for
34: end for
35: h← argmax
p∈P s
(V Rp (S
s)− Bp(Ss)Rp )
36: while BhRh +(Rh×B) ≥ 0
∧
Ss 6= P s ∧ Stasks 6= T
do
37: Stasks ← Stasks ∪ T sh(Ss)
38: Ss ← Ss ∪ {h}
39: for p ∈ P s \ Ss do
40: for t ∈ Tp do
41: if t ∈ T sh then
42: Tp = Tp \ t
43: end if
44: end for
45: end for
46: B = (B ×Rh)− BhRh
47: h← argmax
p∈P s\Ss
(V Rp (S
s)− Bp(Ss)Rp )
48: end while
49: end if
50: Outlier Detection(S, Ss)
51: for s ∈ {S ∪ Ss} do
52: update Rs
53: end for
54: return (S, Ss,P, R)
proceeds to another round of bidding to make the best out
of the platform budget and better satisfy service demanders.
This is done without compromising the user utility as will be
shown below.
3) The impact of varying the number of participants on the
CR: As shown in Fig. 4, when the number of participants
increases, more candidates compete to be chosen by the
platform. Hence, the probability of finding a set of candidates
with high marginal contribution, within the platform budget,
increases. Thus, the CR increases. Our proposed methods
attain consistently higher CR, though, compared to the other
techniques.
4) Concerning user utility: The proposed bidding proce-
dure implies two types of user utility: The primary users utility
which is the difference between the payment and the cost of
each winner, and is given as
Ui = Pi − Ci ; i ∈ S, (3)
and the secondary users utility which is given by:
U˜j =
{
Bj − Cj if Bj > Cj
∧
j ∈ Ss,
0 otherwise. (4)
We formulate the overall utility as their sum, which is given
by:
Uov =
∑
i∈S
Ui +
∑
j∈Ss
U˜j . (5)
Concerning the cost for each secondary winner:
• If the descriptive bid is higher than or equal the collective
bid, the winner’s cost is equal to the collective bid.
• Otherwise, the winner’s cost is equal to the descriptive
bid, and the user utility is equal to zero.
Hence, our two-stage bid algorithm is individually rational
[13], meaning that each user can never have a negative user
TABLE II: A summary of the different simulated scenarios and their corresponding parameter values.
Impact of #Auctions Impact of #Tasks Impact of #Participants
Parameters Values Case Values Case Values Case
#Tasks 100 Constant 100-500 Increasing  by 100 100 Constant
#Participants 100 Constant 1000 Constant 100-1000 Increasing  by 100
#Auctions 100-1000 Increasing  by 100
5 for each tasks 
case Constant
5 for each 
participants case Constant
TABLE III: Average task completion percentages of 2SB-
RA, 2SB-RU, PTB-RA, and PTB-RU compared to TSCM and
Msensing.
Technique 2SB-
RA
PTB-
RA
TSCM 2SB-
RU
PTB-
RU
Msen-
sing
%Completion 14% 11% 5% 24% 24% 7%
Fig. 3: The impact of varying the number of tasks on
the performance of 2SB with its reputation-aware (RA) and
reputation-unaware (RU) versions.
utility. Fig. 5 depicts the average user utility which is given
as
Uavg−user =
∑
i∈S Ui
|S| +
∑
j∈Ss U˜j
|Ss| · (6)
B. Simulation Results for Per-task Bidding
In the following simulations, we used the same parameters,
and investigated the impact of the same factors as in the 2SB
algorithm, which are summarized in Table II. With regards
to the impact of changing the number of auctions on the
CR, similar to the 2SB case, the average percentage of tasks
completion has been found to be nearly constant regardless
the number of held auctions, and is given in Table III.
1) The impact of varying the number of tasks on the CR:
As we can see in Fig. 6: as the number of tasks increases, the
performance of the PTB algorithm deteriorates. This is because
Fig. 4: The impact of varying the number of participants on
the performance of 2SB.
Fig. 5: Comparing the average user utility attained by the 2SB
to that attained by recent algorithms in the literature.
the summation of the descriptive bids list (for one participant)
increases, leading to a negative marginal contribution; thus the
user is excluded by the platform.
2) The impact of varying the number of participants on
the CR: As mentioned earlier, increasing the number of
participants generally leads to increasing the CR, since the
platform has a richer pool of choices. Meanwhile, since the
Fig. 6: The impact of varying the number of tasks on the
performance of PTB, N = 1000.
PTB uses descriptive bids only, which is budget-demanding,
the 2SB and TSCM attain higher completion ratios on average.
When the impact of the budget constraints is more than the
impact of the increasing number of participants, we find a CR
that rises with a very small rate as depicted in Fig. 7.
C. Comparing Per-task Bidding to two-stage Bidding
To compare the performance of 2SB-RA and PTB-RA, we
run ten-100 successive auctions with N = 100 and M = 100.
We find that the PTB algorithm gives higher task completion
ratios in an average of 1%− 2% of the held auctions. This is
depicted in Fig. 8.
For the reputation-unaware versions of the 2SB and the PTB
algorithms, the performance of both of them has been found
to be quite similar (with regards to the attained CR) when the
number of tasks is set to M ≥ 100. When the number of
tasks decreases at high values of N , the PTB outperforms
the 2SB, and the gap between their performance increases
proportionally with N . This is because the tasks in the former,
are not allowed to be performed more than once, unlike the
2SB case. Through ten-100 successive auctions having 50
tasks and 300 participants, the PTB algorithm showed better
performance in an average of 31.4% of the held auctions. This
percentage rises to 88.4% when the number of participants
increases to 500. In Fig. 9, through 100 successive auctions,
we increased the number of participants to N ≥ 600; by then,
the percentage rose to 100% of the held auctions, i.e., all of
the held auctions.
Drawbacks of descriptive bidding-based auctions. It is
worth mentioning that the proposed bidding procedures require
considerably higher interaction from the participants, than
previous techniques in the literature, due to the process of
indicating a separate bid for every sensing task.
IV. CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first
to address the challenge of maximizing the CR in auction-
Fig. 7: The impact of varying the number of participants on
the performance of PTB, M = 100.
based participatory MCS systems by proposing novel bidding
procedures. The free parameters of these algorithms were
identified and we simulated varying scenarios (varying number
of auctions, tasks, and participants) in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed techniques. Remarkable increase
has been achieved, compared to the recent literature, with
regards to the CR. Particularly, the 2SB algorithm has been
demonstrated to consistently outperform the former reputation-
aware techniques. Also, the user utility, under the proposed
formulation, has been improved. Future work involves a new
formulation for platform utility emphasizing the CR, in addi-
tion to learning models from synthetic data based on which
the system can adaptively decide the bidding procedure that
maximizes the CR over a window in time.
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